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Abstract
We propose a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing so-
cial welfare orderings (SWOs) with respect to the degree of inequality aver-
sion they express. We consider three versions of the procedure: (i) a criterion
based on the Lorenz quasi-ordering which we argue to be the ideal version,
(ii) a criterion based on a minimalist concept of inequality, and (iii) a crite-
rion based on the relative differentials quasi-ordering. It turns out that the
traditional Arrow-Pratt approach is equivalent to the latter two criteria for
important classes of SWOs, but that it is profoundly inconsistent with the
Lorenz-based criterion. With respect to the problem of combining extreme
inequality aversion and monotonicity, criteria (ii) and (iii) identify as ex-
tremely inequality averse a set of SWOs that includes leximin as a special
case, whereas the Lorenz-based criterion concludes that extreme inequality
aversion and monotonicity are incompatible.
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1 Introduction
How should we compare different social preference relations over income distri-
butions with respect to the degree of inequality aversion, i.e., the degree of dislike
towards inequality, they express? We propose a procedure for comparing degrees
of inequality aversion that can be loosely formulated as follows:
Procedure (?): An SWO W is at least as inequality averse as an SWO ′W if
and only if, for all income distributions x and y such that x is less unequal than
y according to a pre-specified inequality quasi-ordering, (i) W strictly prefers x
to y (x W y) whenever ′W strictly prefers x to y (x ′W y), and (ii) W weakly
prefers x to y (x ∼W y or x W y) whenever ′W is indifferent between x and y
(x∼′W y).
Note that in order to make this procedure operational, an inequality quasi-ordering
must first be chosen. This feature of Procedure (?) makes explicit the fact that,
underlying any criterion for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, there nec-
essarily has to be a concept for making comparisons according to inequality—
obviously, to be able to check whether an SWO expresses more or less dislike
towards inequality than another SWO, it must be clear what is meant by inequal-
ity in the first place. Once an inequality quasi-ordering is chosen, Procedure (?)
turns into a fully operational criterion which entails a straightforward check for
dominance: an SWO is referred to as at least as inequality averse as another if it
implies, in all relevant choice situations (i.e., those pairs of income distributions
that are strictly ranked using the chosen inequality quasi-ordering), an at least
as inequality averse choice as the other (as defined in (i) and (ii) of Procedure
(?)). Procedure (?) can furthermore be shown to be consistent with the common
approach of measuring the degree of inequality aversion by the amount of mean
income an SWO is prepared to forego in exchange for a given decrease in inequal-
ity (see Section 3).
Interestingly, the traditional Arrow-Pratt criterion for comparing degrees of
inequality aversion1 is a special case of Procedure (?). Roughly speaking, the
Arrow-Pratt criterion is obtained in the case where the chosen inequality quasi-
ordering is the extremely simplistic one which allows only (strict) inequality com-
parisons between, on the one hand, unequal income distributions and, on the other
hand, perfectly equal ones (see Section 4). In this paper, we take the point of view
that while Procedure (?) is the appropriate way to approach the problem of com-
paring degrees of inequality aversion, the Arrow-Pratt version of the procedure is
unattractive because it is based on an unduly restrictive inequality quasi-ordering.
Taking into consideration its central place in the literature on inequality measure-
1The Arrow-Pratt approach is discussed thoroughly in Lambert (2001).
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ment, the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering seems a much more suitable candidate
for this role. This critique of the Arrow-Pratt criterion echoes that of Ross (1981)
in the context of decision under risk. Ross argues that for a comparison of risk
aversion between two expected utility maximizers, it is not sufficient to compare
the premia they are maximally prepared to pay for an insurance against all risks,
as the Arrow-Pratt criterion prescribes, but it is also necessary to consider premia
for insurances that decrease risk to a lower, but still risky, level. Our proposal to
consider the criterion based on Procedure (?) with the Lorenz inequality quasi-
ordering is similar to that proposed by Ross since his concept of decreases in risk
is close to the Lorenz concept.
Throughout the paper, we will often be concerned with comparing results
yielded by, on the one hand, the version of Procedure (?) that is equivalent to
the Arrow-Pratt criterion and, on the other hand, the favoured version of Proce-
dure (?) using the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering (henceforth referred to as the
“Lorenz-based criterion”). It is interesting, however, to consider also a third crite-
rion which is intermediate between the Arrow-Pratt criterion and the Lorenz-based
criterion—this third criterion is based on the relative differentials quasi-ordering,
a concept that is stronger than the minimalist inequality concept that underlies
the Arrow-Pratt criterion and weaker than the Lorenz quasi-ordering (see Moyes,
1994).
In this paper, we first compare the three criteria for the class of continuous and
monotonic SWOs, the broadest class of SWOs to which the conventional Arrow-
Pratt criterion is commonly applied. We show that the relative differentials-based
criterion yields the same results as the Arrow-Pratt criterion if SWOs are in ad-
dition separable, but not necessarily otherwise. Unfortunately, such consistency
turns out not to hold between the Lorenz-based criterion and the Arrow-Pratt crite-
rion, not even with respect to the important class of constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) SWOs (a subclass of the class of continuous, monotonic and separable
SWOs). Usually, a CES SWO with a higher value of the single parameter, ε , is
considered more inequality averse than one with a lower value of ε . This role of ε
as a measure for the degree of inequality aversion, is justified in the framework of
the Arrow-Pratt criterion for comparing degrees of inequality aversion. However,
as straightforward examples show, it is not justified if the Lorenz-based criterion
is adopted: given two income distributions such that one Lorenz dominates the
other, it is quite possible that a CES SWOs with ε strictly prefers the Lorenz dom-
inating income distribution, while a CES SWOs with ε ′ > ε strictly prefers the
other one. Moreover, using a result by Ross (1981) we show that such examples
can be found for any two CES SWOs. In other words, if the Lorenz-based cri-
terion is adopted, no two CES SWOs can be compared with respect to degree of
inequality aversion.
Second, we study the concept of “extreme inequality aversion” for the three
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different criteria for comparing degrees of inequality aversion. We call an SWO
extremely inequality averse in a class of SWOs S if and only if it is at least as
inequality averse as all SWOs in S (and, moreover, is itself a member of S). In
the literature, leximin is often seen as a typical example of an SWO that com-
bines extreme inequality aversion with monotonicity. We show that, in the class
of monotonic SWOs, both the Arrow-Pratt criterion and the relative differentials-
based criterion identify the entire class of weakly maximin SWOs as the extremely
inequality averse ones—an SWO is said to be weakly maximin if and only if it im-
plies a strict preference for a given income distribution over another if the worst
off is strictly better off in the given income distribution. The class includes leximin
and, by consequence, the Arrow-Pratt criterion and the relative differentials based
criterion can be said to support the conventional view (see also Tungodden and
Vallentyne, 2004). However, if the Lorenz-based criterion is adopted, this view
has to be abandoned: we show that in this case the set of extremely inequality
averse monotonic SWOs is empty. Finally, we provide evidence that the incom-
patibility between extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity is robust with
respect to certain reasonable changes in the definition of the concept of extreme
inequality aversion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with preliminaries. In Sec-
tion 3 we formally introduce and discuss the three criteria for comparing degrees
of inequality aversion that constitute the topic of the paper. The questions of how
the three criteria compare with respect to the class of continuous and monotonic
SWOs, and with respect to the concept of extreme inequality aversion, are dealt
with in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Some concluding remarks are given in
Section 6. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by introducing basic definitions and notation. An income distribution
is a vector (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn++ where n ≥ 3 is the number of individuals in so-
ciety and xi is the income of individual i. For convenience we assume a fixed
population size throughout the paper. The set of individuals is N and the set of
income distributions is X . We assume that, for any income distribution x ∈ X ,
individuals are indexed such that it holds that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xn. In accordance
with this assumption, we suppose that all considered concepts for welfare and
inequality comparisons satisfy anonymity—that is, any given income distribution
is treated equivalently as each of its permutations. The arithmetic mean of any
income distribution x ∈ X is written as µ(x). We use the symbol 1n to denote
an n-dimensional vector of which all components are equal to 1. For any pair of
income distributions, x,y ∈ X , we write x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N with at least
4
one strict inequality, and we write x y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N.
Social preferences are represented by a social welfare ordering (SWO) W
(“is at least as good as”) on X .2 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of W are
denoted with W (“is better than”) and ∼W (“is equally good as”), respectively.
A social welfare function is a function W : X → R which represents some SWO.
We shall require certain axioms in our analysis. Roughly speaking, continuity
ensures that small changes in an income distribution cause only small changes in
its social welfare ranking with respect to other income distributions.
Axiom 1 (Continuity). For all x∈ X , {y |y ∈ X ,yW x} and {y |y ∈ X ,xW y}
are closed in X .
Monotonicity says that it is an improvement if some individuals get better off
without any individuals getting worse off.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). For all x,y ∈ X , if x > y then xW y.
Separability requires that the social welfare ranking of any pair of income
distributions is not influenced by the incomes that are the same in both income
distributions.
Axiom 3 (Separability). For all ˆN ⊂ N and for all x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X , if xi = yi and
x′i = y′i for all i∈ ˆN, and xi = x′i and yi = y′i for all i∈N\ ˆN, then xW y⇔ x′W y′.
Any SWO that satisfies continuity, monotonicity and separability can be rep-
resented by a social welfare function of the following form:
W (x) =
n
∑
i=1
u(xi) for all x ∈ X , (1)
where u : R++ → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function, referred to
as a utility function. We shall pay special attention in our analysis to the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) class of SWOs, an important subclass of the class
of continuous, monotonic and separable SWOs. An SWO εW is a member of the
CES class if and only if there exists a nonnegative scalar ε such that εW can be
represented by (1) with utility function u(x) = 11−ε x1−ε for all x ∈ R++.
Since comparisons of income distributions with respect to inequality are con-
ceptually prior to comparisons of SWOs with respect to degree of inequality aver-
sion, we require the concept of an inequality quasi-ordering (IQO) I (“is not
more unequal than”) on X .3 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of I are de-
noted by≺I (“is less unequal than”) and∼I (“is equally unequal as”), respectively.
2An ordering is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation.
3A quasi-ordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
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An inequality measure is a function I : X → R which represents some complete
IQO. The strongest IQO to receive broad acceptance amongst economists is the
Lorenz IQO. The Lorenz IQO, written asLI , is defined as follows: for all x,y∈X ,
xLI y⇔
1
n
k
∑
i=1
xi
µ(x)
≥ 1
n
k
∑
i=1
yi
µ(y)
for all k = 1, . . . ,n.
An IQO I will be referred to as Lorenz consistent if it agrees with all compar-
isons made by the Lorenz IQO, i.e., if ≺LI⊂≺I and ∼LI⊂∼I . We shall refer to an
SWO as Lorenz consistent if it follows the asymmetric part of the Lorenz IQO for
comparisons between income distributions with the same mean incomes.4
Axiom 4 (Lorenz Consistency). For all x,y ∈ X , if µ(x) = µ(y) and x≺LI y then
xW y.
In the literature, social welfare functions are often assumed to depend on mean
income and inequality only, i.e., it is assumed that there exists an inequality mea-
sure I and a function f : (R++×R)→ R, increasing in the first argument and
decreasing in the second, such that W = f (µ, I). Given that perspective, it is clear
that Lorenz consistency is a weak requirement for SWOs—it is sufficient that the
underlying inequality measure is Lorenz consistent.5 We note that all CES SWOs
are Lorenz consistent and can be written as a function of mean income and in-
equality. Specifically, it can be shown that any CES SWO εW can be represented
by a social welfare function of the form W (x) = µ(x) [1− Iε(x)] for all x ∈ X ,
where Iε is a Lorenz consistent inequality measure.6
In this paper we study a general approach for comparing SWOs with respect to
the degree of inequality aversion they express. This approach will be described in
the next section. It is instructive, however, to first consider the standard so-called
Arrow-Pratt approach, which in Section 4 will be compared with the approach
suggested in this paper. The analysis of Pratt (1964) concerning risk aversion has
provided several equivalent criteria that can be applied to the problem of com-
paring degrees of inequality aversion (see also Lambert, 2001, pp. 94-97). Some
of these criteria can only be used to compare SWOs that can be written in the
expected utility form, i.e., SWOs that satisfy continuity, monotonicity and sepa-
rability. This class is important and we shall pay special attention to it. However,
4So we use the same term for two different concepts of Lorenz consistency. However, confu-
sion is avoided because it will always be clear from the context whether the Lorenz consistency
concept for IQOs or that for SWOs is meant.
5Note that, for any continuous, monotonic and separable SWO W , Lorenz consistency is
satisfied if the following weaker criterion is satisfied: µ(x)1W x for all x ∈ X such that x is not
perfectly equal.
6See Atkinson (1970).
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since we wish to initially consider the entire class of continuous and monotonic
SWOs, we focus on the strongest of Pratt’s criteria that is applicable also to non-
separable SWOs, viz., the criterion based on the equally distributed equivalent in-
come (EDEI). The EDEI, ξ (W ;x), for any income distribution x and any SWO
W , is the income that, when equally distributed, yields the same level of wel-
fare according to W as the income distribution x.7 Formally, for any SWO W
and any x ∈ X , ξ (W ;x) = e if and only if e1n ∼W x. The criterion for compar-
ing degrees of inequality aversion based on the EDEI concept, referred to as the
“EDEI-based criterion” (EDEI-BC), is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (EDEI-BC). LetW and′W be any two continuous and monotonic
SWOs. Then, W is at least as inequality averse as ′W if and only if, for all
x ∈ X , ξ (W ;x)≤ ξ (′W ;x).
As is conventional, we say that W is more inequality averse than ′W if W
is at least as inequality averse as ′W while ′W is not at least as inequality averse
as W , and we say that W is equally inequality averse as ′W if W is at least as
inequality averse as ′W and ′W is at least as inequality averse as W .
The idea of the EDEI-BC is to compare, for all income distributions, how
much sacrifice of mean income SWOs maximally allow in order to move from
a given income distribution to a perfectly equal one—for an SWO W and an
income distribution x, this sacrifice equals [µ(x)−ξ (W ;x)]. According to the
EDEI-BC, an SWO in the CES class is more inequality averse as the value of its
corresponding ε is greater.8 For this reason, ε is traditionally interpreted as being
a parameter of inequality aversion.
We close the section by discussing the concept of extreme inequality aversion
which will be the focus of Section 5. Conventionally, maximin and leximin, both
of which give absolute priority to the worst off, are seen as typical examples of
extremely inequality averse SWOs. Maximin implies indifference in all cases in
which the worst off is equally well off, i.e., an SWO W is maximin if and only
if, for all x,y ∈ X , x W y ⇔ x1 ≥ y1. Leximin, on the other hand, gives priority
to the second worst off in the cases where the worst off is equally well off in both
alternatives, and so on, i.e., an SWO W is leximin if and only if for all x,y ∈ X ,
it holds that
xW y⇔ x = y, or, there is an integer k such that
xi = yi for all i < k and xk > yk.
Both maximin and leximin are members of the class of weakly maximin SWOs,
which is the class of SWOs that all have in common the asymmetric part of max-
imin, i.e., an SWOW is weakly maximin if and only if, for all x,y∈ X , if x1 > y1
7See Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969).
8In fact, ε is the value of the relative Arrow-Pratt measure of risk/inequality aversion.
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then x W y. It can straightforwardly be shown that maximin is the only contin-
uous member of the class of weakly maximin SWOs and that leximin is the only
separable member of the class. We will focus on leximin rather than on maximin
in this paper because leximin satisfies monotonicity, whereas maximin does not.
The role of leximin as being extremely inequality averse can be defended on the
basis of the EDEI-BC. For instance, Hammond (1975) has demonstrated that lex-
imin can be interpreted as the limit case, ε → ∞, of the CES class of SWOs. This
point can be generalized with respect to the entire class of continuous, monotonic
and separable SWOs (see Lambert, 2001, p. 101, Theorem 4.4).
3 Three Criteria for Comparing Degrees of Inequality Aver-
sion
As mentioned in the introduction, we wish to consider comparisons of SWOs with
respect to degree of inequality aversion using criteria based on Procedure (?). We
shall now give a formal outline of this procedure. First, we determine a set which
contains exactly all pairs of income distributions such that one income distribution
is strictly more unequal than the other according to some “reference” IQO (clearly,
this set is simply the asymmetric part of the reference IQO on X). These are
exactly all pairs for which each SWO either implies an inequality averse choice
(the less unequal income distribution is chosen), a neutral choice (indifference),
or an inequality prone choice (the more unequal one is chosen)—three choices
which can of course be unambiguously ranked from most inequality averse to least
inequality averse. Second, two SWOs are compared with respect to the choices
implied for each of the pairs of income distributions in the asymmetric part of
the reference IQO: one SWO is referred to as at least as inequality averse as the
other if and only if it implies an at least as inequality averse choice for all pairs
belonging to the reference set.
In principle, any IQO can be chosen to determine the reference set in the first
stage of the outlined procedure. However, since different people may have differ-
ent reasonable views with respect to inequality comparisons, it seems preferable
to consider the common part of all these views. Now, this is exactly the role that is
often attributed to the Lorenz criterion in the literature. We argue, therefore, that it
is most appropriate to use as the set of pairs of income distributions for which two
SWOs are compared, the set ≺LI . We refer to the criterion for comparing degrees
of inequality aversion based on the Lorenz IQO as the “L-based criterion” (L-BC)
and define it as follows.
Definition 2 (L-BC). Let W and ′W be any two SWOs. Then, W is at least as
inequality averse as ′W if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≺LI y, it holds
that, (i) if x′W y then xW y, and, (ii) if x∼′W y then xW y.
8
The “more inequality averse than” and “equally inequality averse as” relations
corresponding to the L-BC are defined in the same way as with the EDEI-BC.
The L-BC is closely related to the concept of “strong risk aversion” studied
by Ross (1981). Ross’ concept is obtained if the L-BC is restricted to SWOs
of the expected utility form, i.e., SWOs satisfying continuity, monotonicity and
separability, and if the absolute version of the Lorenz IQO is used instead of the
regular (relative) version.9
Given the broad acceptance of the Lorenz IQO we consider the L-BC to be
the ideal criterion for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, but to allow for
a stronger link with the existing literature on the topic, we shall also consider
two different criteria that will appear to be closer to the conventional Arrow-Pratt
framework, i.e., to the EDEI-BC. The idea behind these criteria is the same as
that behind the L-BC, the only difference being that (weaker) alternatives for the
Lorenz IQO are used—that is, in both cases, in comparing two SWOs a set is
considered which is a proper subset of ≺LI . The first alternative IQO we consider
is the minimalist IQO, written as MI : for all x,y ∈ X ,
xMI y⇔ x = e1n for some scalar e.
The minimalist IQO only allows inequality comparisons between pairs of income
distribution of which at least one is perfectly equal. The second alternative is the
relative differentials IQO, written as RDI : for all x,y ∈ X ,
xRDI y⇔
xi
yi
≥ xi+1
yi+1
for all i = 1, . . . ,(n−1) .
The relative differentials IQO, which was introduced into the literature on income
distribution by Moyes (1994), says that any progressive redistribution decreases
inequality. The criteria for comparing degrees of inequality aversion based on the
minimalist IQO (M-BC) and the relative differentials IQO (RD-BC) are respec-
tively defined as follows.
Definition 3 (M-BC). LetW and′W be any two SWOs. Then,W is at least as
inequality averse as ′W if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≺MI y, it holds
that, (i) if x′W y then xW y, and, (ii) if x∼′W y then xW y.
Definition 4 (RD-BC). Let W and ′W be any two SWOs. Then, W is at least
as inequality averse as ′W if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x ≺RDI y, it
holds that, (i) if x′W y then xW y, and, (ii) if x∼′W y then xW y.
9Definition 2 moreover has a different phrasing than the concept of Ross (1981). Statement
(ii) of Proposition 1 below and condition (3) in the proof of Lemma 2 below, are closer to the
formulation used by Ross.
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The “more inequality averse than” and “equally inequality averse as” relations
corresponding to the M-BC and RD-BC are defined as before.
The M-BC is sometimes considered in the literature on risk aversion, but in
a restricted version that makes the criterion applicable only to SWOs of the ex-
pected utility form. It is an established result in this context that, for SWOs of
the expected utility form, the M-BC and the EDEI-BC are equivalent.10 A more
general result will be shown to hold in Section 4.
Since the three criteria rely on comparisons of choices over pairs of income
distributions which are members of some set which represents a view on inequal-
ity, ≺MI , ≺RDI and ≺LI , respectively, and given the fact that ≺MI ⊂≺RDI ⊂≺LI , the
following remark is straightforwardly established.
Remark 1. Let W and ′W be any two SWOs. Then, of the following three
statements, (i) implies (ii) but (ii) does not imply (i), and (ii) implies (iii) but (iii)
does not imply (ii):
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the L-BC.
(ii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the RD-BC.
(iii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the M-BC.
It is easily verified that the relationships described in Remark 1 also hold for
the relation “is equally inequality averse as,” but not for the relation “is more
inequality averse than.”
Remark 1 shows that the RD-BC is more demanding than the M-BC and, in
turn, the L-BC is more demanding than the RD-BC. A consequence is that if, for
instance, the M-BC and the L-BC yield a different conclusion, then this disagree-
ment will typically be of the type where the M-BC ranks two SWOs whereas the
L-BC does not. The converse case, as well as cases in which the M-BC and the
L-BC rank two SWOs in opposite ways, are excluded by Remark 1. In this re-
spect it is important to note that if two SWOs, say W and ′W , are incomparable
according to one of the three criteria, this does not simply mean that there is not
sufficient evidence to refer to one SWO as at least as inequality averse as the other,
but, more strongly, it means that the evidence is pointing in different directions:
for some pair(s) of income distributionsW is locally more inequality averse than
′W , while for (an)other pair(s) ′W is locally more inequality averse than W .
We saw in the previous section that the EDEI-BC can be interpreted as a crite-
rion for comparing the willingness of SWOs to sacrifice mean income in return for
a given decrease in inequality. Since this view of inequality aversion as essentially
describing a trade-off between mean income and equality is popular, we wish to
10See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 191, Proposition 6.C.2)—the restricted version of the
M-BC is close to their statement (v).
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demonstrate that the L-BC, the M-BC and the RD-BC are consistent with it—i.e.,
that these three criteria can be rephrased in terms of the mean income-equality
trade-off. The following propositions show that according to each of the three
criteria, for any continuous and monotonic SWOs W and ′W , W is at least as
inequality averse as ′W if and only if, starting from any income distribution, W
accepts a move to a given lower level of inequality at a loss of at least as much
income as ′W does.
Proposition 1. Let W and ′W be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the L-BC.
(ii) For all x,x′,y ∈ X such that x ∼LI x′, x ≺LI y, x ∼W y and x′ ∼′W y, it holds
that µ(x)≤ µ(x′).
Proposition 2. Let W and ′W be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the M-BC.
(ii) For all x,x′,y ∈ X such that x∼MI x′, x≺MI y, x∼W y and x′ ∼′W y, it holds
that µ(x)≤ µ(x′).
Proposition 3. Let W and ′W be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the RD-BC.
(ii) For all x,x′,y∈ X such that x∼RDI x′, x≺RDI y, x∼W y and x′∼′W y, it holds
that µ(x)≤ µ(x′).
The proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 are very similar to that of Proposition 1
and are therefore omitted.
To conclude the section, we mention two reasons for preferring the simple
formulation used in Definitions 2 to 4—i.e., the formulation in terms only of pref-
erences over pairs of income distributions—to the more traditional formulation in
terms of the mean income-equality trade-off. First, the formulation in Definitions
2 to 4 has the advantage that it allows application of the criteria to all SWOs—also
for instance to non-continuous SWOs, which will be useful in the discussion of ex-
treme inequality aversion in Section 5. Second, a deeper concern is that an explicit
reference to a mean income-equality trade-off may in certain cases misrepresent
what comparisons of inequality aversion are really about. In general, there is no
reason why equality should be traded off only with mean income. SWOs may
express interest for other concerns, such as poverty alleviation for instance—then,
the trade-off with mean income is just one of several trade-offs that are relevant
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for the concept of inequality aversion.11 As the neutral formulation used in Defi-
nitions 2 to 4 does not refer to any particular trade-off, it seems to better capture
the general essence of the concept of inequality aversion.
4 The Three Criteria Versus the Arrow-Pratt Framework
The objective of this section is to compare the Arrow-Pratt criterion, i.e., the
EDEI-BC, with the three criteria presented in the previous section. We will focus
on the conclusions yielded by these four criteria with respect to the class of contin-
uous and monotonic SWOs since that is the broadest class to which the EDEI-BC
is usually applied. If it is the case that the M-BC, RD-BC or L-BC, respectively,
is not equivalent to the EDEI-BC for this class of SWOs, then we will examine
whether this is at least the case for the important CES class.
Although we are most interested in the L-BC for the reason specified in Section
3, it is convenient for expositional purposes to start with the comparison of the
EDEI-BC with the M-BC and RD-BC. These criteria will appear to be closer to
the EDEI-BC than the L-BC is. We mentioned already in the previous section
that the M-BC and the EDEI-BC are equivalent for continuous, monotonic and
separable SWOs. As the following proposition shows, this equivalence also holds
if separability is not demanded.
Proposition 4. Let W and ′W be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the EDEI-BC.
(ii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the M-BC.
The result in Proposition 4 is not very surprising, given the fact that the def-
initions of both the M-BC and the EDEI-BC refer to preferences over pairs of
income distributions of which one is perfectly equal. The following result shows
that, when we take the step from the minimalist IQO to the relative differentials
IQO as the underlying inequality concept for the criterion, we move away from
convention.
Proposition 5. Let W and ′W be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs.
Then, of the following two statements, (ii) implies (i) but (i) does not imply (ii):
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the EDEI-BC.
(ii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the RD-BC.
11Note that, in principle, it may be the case that mean income is not even a concern at all (and
that the SWO is not monotonic).
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Proposition 5 reveals that the RD-BC and the EDEI-BC are inconsistent for
the considered class of continuous and monotonic SWOs. The inconsistency of
the two criteria consists of there being SWOs such that the EDEI-BC ranks them
while the RD-BC does not. As we said earlier, we wish to pay special attention
to the class of CES SWOs as they play such an important role in the literature.
Do the RD-BC and the EDEI-BC at least agree on how to rank the CES SWOs?
Consider first the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1. Let W and ′W be any two continuous, monotonic and separable
SWOs. Consider, moreover, any pair x,y ∈ X such that
there is an integer k such that xi ≥ yi for all i < k, and xi ≤ yi for all i≥ k. (2)
Then, of the following two statements, (i) implies (ii):
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the EDEI-BC.
(ii) If x∼′W y then xW y, and, if x′W y then xW y.
The following result shows that not only do the RD-BC and the EDEI-BC
agree on how to rank the members of the CES class of SWOs, but also on how to
rank any pair of SWOs of the expected utility form.
Proposition 6. LetW and′W be any two continuous, monotonic and separable
SWOs. Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the EDEI-BC.
(ii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the M-BC.
(iii) W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the RD-BC.
With respect to the M-BC and the RD-BC we may conclude that the former,
and to a lesser extent the latter, support the claims made traditionally in the lit-
erature on the basis of the Arrow-Pratt criterion. An important question we now
turn to is whether the favoured L-BC is consistent with these claims. We already
know, by Remark 1 and Proposition 5, that the L-BC and the EDEI-BC cannot be
equivalent for the entire class of monotonic and continuous SWOs, so the question
becomes whether this equivalence at least holds for the popular CES class as with
the RD-BC. This appears not to be the case. There are several pairs of CES SWOs
εW and ε
′
W such that ε > ε ′, and several pairs of income distributions x,y ∈ X
such that x≺LI y, for which it holds that yεW x while xε
′
W y. This is illustrated
in the following example.
Example 1. The example is for the case n = 3. Take the income distributions
x = (19,57,76) and y = (20,20,130). It can be shown that x≺LI y. However, for
all CES SWOs for which ε is such that 0.403 < ε < 14.513 it holds that xεW y,
while for all CES SWOs for which ε > 14.514 it holds that yεW x.
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Using a result by Ross (1981) it is possible to draw even stronger conclusions
with respect to the CES class. Ross’ critique of the Arrow-Pratt framework can
be interpreted as a confrontation of the L-BC and the M-BC in the framework of
expected utility theory. The following lemma is based on one of his results. We
use our own notation and terminology.
Lemma 2. Let uW and vW be any two continuous, monotonic and separable
SWOs such that the respective corresponding utility functions in (1), u and v, are
twice differentiable. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) uW is at least as inequality averse as vW according to the L-BC.
(ii) There exist a decreasing and concave function f : R++ → R and a scalar
λ > 0 such that, for all x ∈ R++, u(x) = λv(x)+ f (x).
It can be shown now that in the entire class of CES SWOs there are no two
SWOs that can be compared according to the L-BC.
Proposition 7. LetεW andε
′
W be any CES SWOs such that ε 6= ε ′. Then,εW and
ε ′W are incomparable according to the L-BC, i.e., εW is not at least as inequality
averse as ε ′W according to the L-BC, and ε
′
W is not at least as inequality averse
as εW according to the L-BC.
The CES class of SWOs is often considered to be very useful in practice
because, according to the conventional Arrow-Pratt approach, it encompasses a
continuum of positions with respect to inequality aversion from the completely
non-egalitarian mean income rule (ε = 0) to leximin (ε → ∞). It owes its popu-
larity furthermore to the fact that it has attractive properties from the theoretical
perspective: it satisfies the basic axioms continuity, monotonicity and separabil-
ity, and allows a natural decomposition into mean income and a Lorenz consistent
inequality measure as explained in Section 2. However, the deep inconsistency
between, on the one hand, the conventional interpretation of the parameter ε and,
on the other hand, the L-BC may be seen as somewhat damaging for the CES
class to operate as a canonical class of SWOs. The problem is aggravated by the
fact that all members of the CES class ascribe importance to the Lorenz IQO—
and thus the L-BC—because they are all Lorenz consistent. Is it possible to find
another class of SWOs which both has attractive properties and encompasses a
continuum of degrees of inequality aversion according to the L-BC? Although we
shall not attempt to answer this question here, we wish to note that a sacrifice will
have to be made irrespective of the direction in which an answer is sought. For
instance, the analysis of Ross (1981) can be used to construct a class of SWOs to
play a role similar to that of the CES class, in which case continuity, monotonicity
and separability will still be satisfied. However, the drawback is that in that case
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the natural link between welfare and an underlying concept of (Lorenz consistent)
inequality will be lost. Alternatively, such a natural link can be taken as a starting
point to construct an alternative to the CES class, but at the cost of separability.
5 The Three Criteria and Extreme Inequality Aversion
In this section we characterize the classes of SWOs that reconcile monotonicity
with an extreme form of inequality aversion according to each of the three criteria
proposed in Section 3.12 It will be of particular interest to see what role leximin
plays in our analysis, since this is the only popular SWO that is usually viewed
as combining extreme inequality aversion with monotonicity. Since our analysis
brings us at certain points close to the work of Tungodden and Vallentyne (2004),
we will at those points carefully explain the relation between their results and
ours.
We start by defining the term “extreme inequality aversion” formally.
Definition 5. An SWOW is extremely inequality averse in the class S if and only
if W is a member of S and W is at least as inequality averse as any member of
S.
This definition assures that an extremely inequality averse SWO in S never
implies a choice over a pair of income distributions that is less inequality averse
than that implied by any other member of S. Note also that all extremely inequality
averse SWOs are equally inequality averse.
In what follows, we shall identify the members of the class of monotonic
SWOs that are extremely inequality averse according to the M-BC, the RD-BC
and the L-BC. Since we do not require continuity, the standard EDEI-BC cannot
be applied in this context—however, it is natural to interpret the M-BC as being
the evident extension of the EDEI-BC capable of such comparisons. Again, it is
convenient to begin the analysis by considering the M-BC and the RD-BC.
Proposition 8. Let W be any monotonic SWO. Then, the following five state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) W is extremely inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs accord-
ing to the M-BC.
(ii) W is extremely inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs accord-
ing to the RD-BC.
12How the ideals of extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity can be combined is an im-
portant question in egalitarian social ethics. See Tungodden (2003, pp. 10-23) for an overview of
the economic and philosophical literature concerning this topic.
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(iii) For all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, it holds that, if x≺MI y then xW y.
(iv) For all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, it holds that, if x≺RDI y then xW y.
(v) W is weakly maximin.
The equivalence of (i) and (v) in Proposition 8 says that, according to the M-
BC, the case of extreme inequality aversion in the class of monotonic SWOs is
covered by the monotonic weakly maximin SWOs.13 To a certain extent, this
result supports the conventional view that leximin constitutes the case of extreme
inequality aversion. The reason is that the literature focuses virtually exclusively
on separable SWOs when studying extreme inequality aversion,14 combined with
the fact that leximin is the only separable weakly maximin SWO. The finding that
(i) and (v) are equivalent is important for two reasons. Firstly, given Remark 1, it
follows from this result that the classes of extremely inequality averse SWOs that
are implied by the RD-BC and the L-BC must be subsets of the class of monotonic
weakly maximin SWOs. Secondly, it presents another way of seeing why the M-
BC is unattractive. As an illustration of this point, consider the following SWO
W : for all x,y ∈ X , it holds that,
if x1 > y1 then xW y, and
if x1 = y1 then [xW y⇔ µ(x)≥ µ(y)].
Clearly, this SWO is both monotonic and weakly maximin. Now note that when-
ever two income distributions have the same lowest incomes, this SWO ranks
them according to the completely non-egalitarian mean income rule.15 Probably,
many would hesitate to refer to such an SWO as extremely inequality averse, thus
implicitly accepting that the M-BC is too undemanding as a criterion for com-
paring degrees of inequality aversion. However, as the equivalence of (ii) and
(v) shows, moving on to the RD-BC does not solve anything: the class of mono-
tonic weakly maximin SWOs is still identified as the extremely inequality averse
subclass of the class of monotonic SWOs. Before we consider which monotonic
weakly maximin SWOs survive the test of Definition 5 when we move to the
L-BC, we consider the other statements of Proposition 8.
The conditions expressed in statements (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 8 consti-
tute a natural way of giving meaning to extreme inequality aversion for SWOs that
13With an approach analogous to that of Hammond (1975) and Lambert (2001) (mentioned
at the end of Section 2), the same conclusion can be reached using the standard EDEI-BC (see
Bosmans, 2005).
14See Lambert (2001, pp. 99-101).
15Note that the comparison of such income distributions is probably even quite common in
practice—think of a change in the tax system that leaves the existing minimally guaranteed income
unaffected.
16
satisfy monotonicity—the conditions say that one should prefer, for any pair of in-
come distributions, the one which is less unequal (according to the minimalist IQO
and the relative differentials IQO in statements (iii) and (iv), respectively) unless
the income distribution is worse for some and better for none. In a recent study on
the possibility of combining extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity, Tun-
godden and Vallentyne (2004) have taken natural conditions as those expressed in
statements (iii) and (iv) as a starting point (so, relying only implicitly on the con-
cepts defined in our Definitions 2 to 5). They have considered a condition similar
to that of statement (iii) and also show that statements (iii) and (v) are equivalent.
Later, we draw a more interesting parallel between the present work and theirs.
Now, we come to the important question of what extremely inequality averse
SWOs are identified by the L-BC. It quickly appears that none are.
Proposition 9. There is no SWO that is extremely inequality averse in the class of
monotonic SWOs according to the L-BC.
Accordingly, the following proposition shows that it is impossible to use the
idea of statements (iii) and (iv) from Proposition 8 in conjunction with the Lorenz
IQO.16
Proposition 10. Let W be any monotonic SWO. Then, the following condition
is not satisfied: for all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, it holds that, if x ≺LI y then
xW y.
So, while the M-BC and the RD-BC identify all weakly maximin SWOs as
extremely inequality averse, according to the L-BC no member of this class is ex-
tremely inequality averse. Moreover, given the L-BC, the weakly maximin SWOs
do not only fail the test of extreme inequality aversion described in Definition 5,
they do so in a particularly bad way.
Proposition 11. LetW be any continuous and monotonic SWO satisfying Lorenz
consistency. Then, there are several pairs x,y∈X such that x≺LI y, so that xW y
while all weakly maximin SWOs strictly prefer y to x.
The proposition says that, for instance, it is possible to find pairs of income
distributions such that a CES SWO with ε arbitrarily close to, but greater than,
zero, and hence arbitrarily close to the completely non-egalitarian mean income
rule, is locally more inequality averse than all weakly maximin SWOs for these
pairs.
16Combined with the fact that the condition of Proposition 10 is equivalent to an SWO being
extremely inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs according to the L-BC (for a proof,
consider the proof of the equivalence of (i) and (iii) in Proposition 8), Proposition 10 constitutes
an alternative proof of Proposition 9.
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So, we conclude that if we accept the L-BC, then extreme inequality aver-
sion is incompatible with monotonicity. In their work, Tungodden and Vallentyne
(2004) reach a similar conclusion. However, they implicitly use a criterion that
lies in between the M-BC and the RD-BC, and find an incompatibility.17 This is
possible because they use a slightly (but significantly) different framework than
the one used here: their result is driven by the fact that they reject anonymity as a
property of SWOs, but accept it for IQOs. The present study shows that without
this assumption, there is no incompatibility between their version of extreme in-
equality aversion and monotonicity (this is implied by the equivalence of (ii) and
(v) in Proposition 8), but that the incompatibility crops up again when the L-BC
is accepted (Proposition 9).18
What should egalitarians who agree with the L-BC and want both monotonic-
ity and extreme inequality aversion choose as an SWO? It might at first glance
seem natural to regard leximin or other monotonic weakly maximin SWOs as
being “close enough”—these SWOs satisfy a necessary condition for being ex-
tremely inequality averse (they are extremely inequality averse if one looks only
at the pairs in ≺MI or ≺RDI ), and a sufficient condition cannot be satisfied (being
extremely inequality averse for those in ≺LI is impossible), hence why not content
ourselves with these? Proposition 11 illustrates already how unattractive it is to
settle for a conclusion based on the less demanding criteria M-BC and RD-BC
if the L-BC is the one which is deemed ideal. There is also a deeper reason for
extreme egalitarians not to (necessarily) focus on the class of weakly maximin
SWOs. It is perfectly acceptable to consider the pairs ordered by the minimalist
IQO (i.e., the set ≺MI ) as not being more important than some alternative set of
pairs ordered by the Lorenz IQO (i.e., a subset of ≺LI which differs from ≺MI ). If
one accepts the Lorenz IQO, these former pairs of income distributions are not
special in any way. If such an alternative set of pairs is used in a criterion for
comparing degrees of inequality aversion, in accordance with the explanation at
the beginning of Section 3, then the set of extremely inequality averse monotonic
SWOs need not be empty nor contain any weakly maximin SWOs. For instance, if
the income distributions from Example 1 are members of this alternative set, then
none of the weakly maximin SWOs pass the test of extreme inequality aversion,
while (depending on the other elements of the set) other SWOs may pass the test.
To conclude the section, we consider two alternative ways of giving meaning
to the view that inequality reduction should always be preferred unless no one
17More precisely, they use a condition similar to that stated in statements (iii) and (iv) of Propo-
sition 8, but with, in the place of the minimalist or relative differentials IQO, an IQO that is a
proper subrelation of the relative differentials IQO and a proper superrelation of the minimalist
IQO.
18In Tungodden (2000) it is also shown that, without rejecting anonymity, their extreme inequal-
ity aversion condition and monotonicity are compatible.
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wins by it. However, as we shall see, neither alternative produces a convincing
way out of the incompatibility.
The first alternative is to consider the SWOs for which no monotonic SWO is
more inequality averse according to the L-BC, instead of the ones that are at least
as inequality averse as all the other monotonic ones according to the L-BC. Con-
sider the following definition of this alternative concept of “maximal inequality
aversion.”
Definition 6. An SWO W is maximally inequality averse in the class S if and
only if W is a member of S and no member of S is more inequality averse than
W .
The subset of SWOs that are maximally inequality averse in the set of mono-
tonic SWOs according to the L-BC is not empty: as the following result shows, at
least leximin is a member.
Proposition 12. Leximin is maximally inequality averse in the set of monotonic
SWOs according to the L-BC.
However, the concept of maximal inequality aversion seems too undemand-
ing, because it is not excluded that there are SWOs, which are themselves un-
likely candidates for being considered extremely inequality averse, that are more
inequality averse for at least some pairs of income distributions—in the case of
leximin, Proposition 11 should suffice to make this point.
A second alternative is to start from the view that SWOs are functions of an
underlying inequality measure, which represents a complete IQO, a view not un-
common in the literature as we saw in Section 2. In that perspective, the follow-
ing alternative to Definition 5 seems reasonable: suppose we can find for some
SWO an IQO which, for any choice not directly implied by monotonicity, indi-
cates lower inequality for the income distribution which is chosen by the SWO,
then, at least according to this view of inequality, the SWO can be considered to
be extremely inequality averse. The question is whether it is possible to find an
SWO and a corresponding IQO that satisfy the required condition. First we need
to consider some minimal criteria that a sensible IQO ought to satisfy. The first
is that it should have the minimalist IQO as a subrelation. The second is that it
satisfies some invariance criterion. An invariance criterion defines the transforma-
tion which when applied to all incomes leaves inequality invariant. For instance,
the invariance criterion underlying the Lorenz IQO and the relative differentials
IQO is scale invariance, which says: for all x ∈ X and all scalars λ > 0, x∼I λx.
However, we will demand only that a much weaker invariance criterion is satis-
fied. Minimal invariance says that for any given income distribution there must
exist an income distribution in which everyone is better off and which is at least
as unequal as the given income distribution.
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Axiom 5 (Minimal Invariance). For all x ∈ X , there is a x′ ∈ X such that x′ x
and xI x′.
The following proposition shows that no SWO and IQO with the described
properties exist.
Proposition 13. Let W be any monotonic SWO and let I be any IQO that
satisfies minimal invariance and such that≺I⊃≺MI . Then, the following condition
is not satisfied: for all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, x≺I y⇔ xW y.
The proposition says that whatever the concept of inequality used (requiring
only that it satisfies minimal conditions—far weaker than Lorenz consistency for
instance), leximin at least for some pairs of income distributions will not choose
the least unequal one according to this concept of inequality, even though this
income distribution is not worse by monotonicity. Moreover, this does not only
hold for leximin, but for all monotonic SWOs.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we considered a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing
SWOs with respect to degree of inequality aversion. We considered three versions
of the procedure based on three inequality concepts: the L-BC which we argued
to be the ideal version, the M-BC which is roughly equivalent to the traditional
Arrow-Pratt approach, and the RD-BC which is intermediate in strength between
the other two criteria.
It was shown that the L-BC is in general incompatible with the M-BC. In the
case of the CES class of SWOs, the difference between the conclusions produced
by the two criteria was especially pronounced: whereas the M-BC ranks all mem-
bers of this class, the L-BC ranks none. As we have said already, it would be
interesting to think about theoretically agreeable alternatives to the CES class of
which the members can be ranked using the L-BC and which covers a wide spec-
trum of positions with respect to inequality aversion. Probably the most attractive
solution is to give up separability and to consider classes of SWOs such as those
given by W (x) = µ(x) [1− I(x)]α for all x ∈ X , where I is a Lorenz consistent
inequality measure and α is a parameter that measures inequality aversion in ac-
cordance with the L-BC. It may be interesting to see whether classes of SWOs in
the spirit of this example can be constructed in a theoretically and philosophically
sound way starting directly from the idea of the natural decomposition of welfare
in mean income and inequality.
We furthermore showed that if we accept the L-BC, then monotonicity and
extreme inequality aversion are incompatible. Hence, egalitarians committed to
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monotonicity have to content themselves with being less than extremely inequal-
ity averse: it is always possible to find pairs of income distributions for which a
less inequality averse choice than possible must be made. Those who are attracted
to both the ideals of monotonicity and extreme inequality aversion have to deter-
mine which of the two to weaken. We have discussed that if extreme inequality
aversion is weakened, nothing forces one to opt for a weakly maximin SWO such
as leximin. It is perfectly possible to choose a different set over which one wants
to make inequality averse choices than the set that forces one to give full priority
to the worst off. The other possibility, not yet discussed, is to weaken monotonic-
ity. For instance, a possibility is to demand only ray-monotonicity: for all x ∈ X
and all λ > 1, λxW x. It can easily be shown that there exist extremely inequal-
ity averse SWOs according to the L-BC in the class of ray-monotonic SWOs.19
Interestingly, not only does the weakening to ray-monotonicity make it possible
to have extremely inequality averse SWOs, but none of them is weakly maximin
(and this holds even if we use the M-BC instead of the L-BC). In other words,
whichever of the two ideals egalitarians choose to weaken in order to deal with
the incompatibility, they should not feel required to restrict their consideration to
leximin or other weakly maximin SWOs.
19Consider the example of an SWO W : for all x,y ∈ X , it holds that, if x ≺I y then x W y,
and if x∼I y then [xW y⇔ µ(x)≥ µ(y)], where I is a Lorenz consistent and complete IQO.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that statement (i) implies statement (ii). Assume that (i) holds.
Take any x,x′,y ∈ X such that x ∼LI x′, x ≺LI y, x ∼W y and x′ ∼′W y. We have
to show that µ(x) ≤ µ(x′). Note first that, for all z,w ∈ X , z ∼LI w if and only if
there exists a scalar λ > 0 such that λz = w. Hence, there exists a λ > 0 such that
λx′ = x. Now, we have x′ W y by (i). So, it follows that λ ≤ 1 by monotonicity.
Hence, we have µ(x)≤ µ(x′).
Second, we show that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Assume that (ii)
holds. Take any x,y ∈ X such that x≺LI y. By continuity and monotonicity, there
exist λ ,λ ′ > 0 such that λx ∼W y and λ ′x ∼′W y. Suppose first that x ′W y.
We have to show that in this case x W y. Note first that x ′W y implies λ ′ <
1 by monotonicity. Since furthermore λ ≤ λ ′ by (ii), we have λ < 1. Hence,
monotonicity implies x W y. By a similar reasoning, x ∼′W y can be shown to
imply xW y. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Statement (i) of Proposition 4 is clearly equivalent to statement (ii) of Proposition
2. Hence, the result follows from Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5
That (ii) implies (i) follows from Proposition 4 and Remark 1.
We give an example to show that (i) does not imply (ii). Consider an SWO
W such that, for all x,y ∈ X ,
xW y⇔ F(x)≥ F(y) ,
where
F(x) =
{ 2
3x1 +
1
3x2 +∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≥ 25x2;
3
13 (4x1 + x2)+∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≤ 25x2.
Consider also an SWO ′W such that, for all x,y ∈ X ,
x′W y⇔ G(x)≥ G(y) ,
where
G(x) =
{ 3
5x1 +
2
5x2 +∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≥ 12x2;
7
30 (4x1 + x2)+∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≤ 12x2.
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Both SWOs are clearly continuous and monotonic.
First, we show that W is at least as inequality averse as ′W according to
the EDEI-BC. We consider, in turn, the three possible cases. (a) Case where
x ∈ A = {x ∈ X |x1 ≥ 12x2}: Note that ξ (W ;x) = 1n−1 (23x1 + 13x2 +∑ni=3 xi) and
ξ (′W ;x) = 1n−1
(3
5x1 +
2
5x2 +∑ni=3 xi
)
for all x∈ A. By consequence, ξ (W ;x)≤
ξ (′W ;x) for all x ∈ A. (b) Case where x ∈ B =
{
x ∈ X | 25x2 ≤ x1 ≤ 12x2
}
: Note
that ξ (W ;x) = 1n−1
(2
3x1 +
1
3x2 +∑ni=3 xi
)
for all x ∈ B. To calculate ξ (′W ;x)
for any given x ∈ B, we first find an y ∈ X such that x ∼′W y and (y1,y2) =(1
2y,y
)
and then use that ξ (′W ;x) = ξ (′W ;y). Now, y is such that 4x1 + x2 =
412y+ y, so that y =
4x1+x2
3 , and yi = xi for all i = 3,4, . . . ,n. Since y ∈ A, we
can calculate ξ (′W ;y) as in the previous case, so that ξ (′W ;x) = ξ (′W ;y) =
1
n−1
(28
30x1 +
7
30x2 +∑ni=3 xi
)
. For all x = (x1,x2) ∈ X , ξ (W ;x)< ξ (′W ;x) if and
only if the condition is met that x1 > 38x2, a condition that holds for all x ∈ B.
(c) Case where x ∈C = {x ∈ X |x1 ≤ 25x2}: To calculate ξ (W ;x) and ξ (′W ;x)
for any given x ∈ C, we use the same method as in the previous case. So, first
we find y,y′ ∈ X such that x ∼W y, x ∼′W y′, (y1,y2) =
(2
5y,y
)
and yi = xi for
all i = 3,4, . . . ,n, (y′1,y′2) =
(2
5y
′,y′
)
and y′i = xi for all i = 3,4, . . . ,n, and then
calculate ξ (W ;y) and ξ (′W ;y′), which are equal to ξ (W ;x) and ξ (′W ;x),
respectively. Note, however, that y = y′, so that, since y,y′ ∈ B, we have that
ξ (W ;y) < ξ (′W ;y′), and hence ξ (W ;x) < ξ (′W ;x) for all x ∈ C. We con-
clude from (a), (b) and (c) thatW is at least as inequality averse as′W according
to the EDEI-BC.
We now show that W is not at least as inequality averse as ′W according to
the RD-BC. Consider x and y such that (x1,xn) = (120,785), (y1,yn) = (100,800)
and xi = yi = 240 for all i = 2,3, . . . ,(n−1). Clearly, x≺RDI y, but yW x while
x′W y. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Let uW and vW be any two continuous, monotonic and separable SWOs with u
and v as utility functions in (1), respectively. Suppose that statement (i) holds with
respect touW andvW , i.e., ξ (uW ;x)≤ ξ
(vW ;x) for all x∈X . Denote the sets of
winners and losers in going from any y ∈ X to any x ∈ X as W (y,x) = {i |xi > yi}
and L(y,x) = {i |xi < yi}, respectively. Throughout the proof we consider the pair
x,y ∈ X , which is any pair for which condition (2) of Lemma 1 holds. What has
to be shown is that statement (ii) holds with respect to this pair, i.e., if x∼vW y then
x uW y, and, if x vW y then x uW y. Therefore, it is assumed that either x ∼vW y
or x vW y holds. Since statement (ii) holds trivially with respect to the pair x,y
in the cases where W (y,x) = ∅ or L(y,x) = ∅, we only consider cases in which
23
both sets are nonempty.
We require a tool to bring any income distribution z ∈ X closer to x by re-
placing at least one of the components of z by a component of x, and this in
such a way that for the resulting income distribution z′ it holds that z ∼vW z′.
Consider a function Ti j which transforms any z ∈ X into z′ by replacing two
and only two incomes, zi and z j. The function Ti j has z in its domain if and
only if zi < xi ≤ x j < z j, in other words, if and only if i ∈ W (z,x) and j ∈
L(z,x), and, furthermore, it holds that i < j. The values of z′i and z′j are de-
termined as follows: (a) if v(xi) + v(x j) = v(zi) + v(z j), then (z′i,z′j) = (xi,x j),
(b) if v(xi) + v(x j) > v(zi) + v(z j), then (z′i,z′j) = (s,x j), where s is such that
zi < s < xi and v(zi)+v(z j) = v(s)+v(x j), (c) if v(xi)+v(x j)< v(zi)+v(z j), then
(z′i,z′j) = (xi, t), where t is such that x j < t < z j and v(zi)+ v(z j) = v(xi)+ v(t).
The s and t considered in cases (b) and (c), respectively, always exist by continuity
and monotonicity. Note that indeed z∼vW z′.
Now, using Ti j, we transform y step by step into x. First, transform y into y′ by
applying Ti j for some i ∈W (y,x) and some j ∈ L(y,x). If W (y′,x) and/or L(y′,x)
is empty, stop. Otherwise, perform the transformation on y′ by again applying
Ti j for some i ∈W (y′,x) and some j ∈ L(y′,x) such that i < j. Repeat this until
the set of winners and/or the set of losers is empty after the transformation, then
stop. Note that the transformation can always be performed if the sets are both
nonempty due to the fact that x,y ∈ X satisfy condition (2) of Lemma 1, since the
condition implies that, for all i ∈W (y,x) and all j ∈ L(y,x), it holds that i < j,
and this continues to hold after every step. So, the income distribution that results
from the final step, say y′′, has the property that W (y′′,x) and/or L(y′′,x) is empty
and y′′ ∼vW y. Furthermore, it is impossible that W (y′′,x) is empty while L(y′′,x)
is not, since otherwise x < y′′ and so y′′ vW x by monotonicity, so that the fact
that y′′ ∼vW y would imply that y vW x, contrary to what we assumed. So, given
that L(y′′,x) must be empty, we have either y′′ < x or y′′ = x and, by consequence,
x is weakly preferred to y′′ by any monotonic SWO.
We shall now show that y′′ ∼vW y implies y′′ uW y. It is known from Pratt
(1964) that ξ (uW ;x) ≤ ξ
(vW ;x) for all x ∈ X implies that u = f ◦ v where the
function f :R→R is strictly increasing and concave. Now for any z ∈ X , z∼vW z′
is equivalent to v(z′i)+ v(z′j) = v(zi)+ v(z j) or v(z′i)− v(zi) = v(z j)− v(z′j). Since
furthermore v(z j)> v(z′j)> v(z′i)> v(zi), it holds that u(z′i)−u(zi)≥ u(z j)−u(z′j)
by strict increasingness and concavity of f . So, we have z′ uW z. Hence, by
transitivity, it holds that y′′ uW y
We can now conclude the following. In the case where x∼vW y, we have indeed
x uW y, since y′′ uW y and since x is weakly preferred to y′′ by any monotonic
SWO. In the case where xvW y we have indeed xuW y, since xvW y and y′′∼vW y
imply xvW y′′ and hence x > y′′, so that, by xuW y′′ and y′′ uW y, xuW y. 
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Proof of Proposition 6
Equivalence of (i) and (ii): Immediate from Proposition 4.
Equivalence of (i) and (iii): That (iii) implies (i) follows from Proposition 5.
That (i) implies (iii) follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that, for any pair x,y∈ X ,
if x≺RDI y then condition (2) of Lemma 1 holds. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Ross (1981) shows (ii) to be equivalent to the condition: for all x,y ∈ X such
that x ≺LI y, if x−piu1 ∼uW y and x−piv1 ∼vW y then piu ≥ piv. We consider the
following condition:
for all x,y ∈ X such that x≺LI y, if γux∼uW y and γvx∼vW y then γu ≤ γv. (3)
If this latter condition is fitted into the proof of Ross instead of the former, it is
easily seen that they play the same role and are equivalent.
What remains to be shown is that the condition in (3) is equivalent to (i). First
we show that (3) is equivalent to
for all x,x′,y ∈ X such that x∼LI x′, x≺LI y, x∼uW y and x′ ∼vW y,
it holds that µ(x)≤ µ(x′). (4)
It is immediate that (4) implies (3). That (3) implies (4) follows from the fact that
if there exist x,x′,y ∈ X such that x∼LI x′, x≺LI y, x∼uW y and x′ ∼vW y, then there
exists a z ∈ X and scalars γu,γv such that x = γuz and x′ = γvz. Now, since (4) is
equivalent to (i) by Proposition 1, the required result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Seeking a contradiction, suppose that, without loss of generality, ε > ε ′ and that
εW is at least as inequality averse asε
′
W according to the L-BC. Then, by Lemma
2, there exist a decreasing and concave function f : R++ → R and a scalar λ > 0
such that, for all x ∈ R++,
x1−ε
1− ε = λ
x1−ε ′
1− ε ′ + f (x) .
Decreasingness and concavity of f imply
d f (x)
dx = x
−ε −λx−ε ′ ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R++, (5)
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and
d f 2(x)
dx2 =−εx
−(1+ε)+λε ′x−(1+ε
′) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R++. (6)
From (5) and (6) it follows that
λ ≥ x−(ε−ε ′) for all x ∈ R++, (7)
and
λ ≤ ε
ε ′
x−(ε−ε
′) for all x ∈ R++, (8)
respectively. Since the functions x 7→ x−(ε−ε ′) and x 7→ εε ′ x−(ε−ε
′) map R++ onto
R++, there exist x,y ∈ R++ such that x−(ε−ε ′) > εε ′ y−(ε−ε
′)
. By consequence, λ
cannot satisfy both (7) and (8) and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 8
Equivalence of (iii) and (v): That (v) implies (iii) is immediate. We prove using
contraposition that (iii) implies (v). Suppose W is a monotonic SWO for which
(v) does not hold, that is,W is not weakly maximin. Then, there is a pair x,y∈X ,
where x1 > y1, such that yW x. Since xW x11n by reflexivity and monotonicity,
it holds by transitivity that yW x11n while not x11n < y and x11n ≺MI y. Hence,
(iii) does not hold for W .
Equivalence of (i) and (iii): That (iii) implies (i) is immediate. We prove using
contraposition that (i) implies (iii). Suppose that W is a monotonic SWO for
which (iii) does not hold, that is, there is a pair x,y ∈ X such that not x < y and
x ≺MI y, while y W x. Now, take any monotonic SWO ′W such that x ′W y.
Clearly, W is not at least as inequality averse as ′W according to the the M-BC.
Hence, (i) does not hold for W .
Equivalence of (iv) and (v): We first show that (v) implies (iv). Let x,y ∈ X be
any pair such that not x < y and x ≺RDI y. Suppose first that µ(x) > µ(y). Then,
there must be an i ∈ N such that xiyi > 1. Since also x ≺RDI y, we have
x1
y1 > 1.
Hence, x W y for any weakly maximin SWO W . Suppose alternatively that
µ(x) ≤ µ(y). Then, because x ≺RDI y, x1 ≤ y1 would imply that xiyi ≤ 1 for all
i ∈ N and xiyi < 1 for at least one i ∈ N and, hence, that x < y which contradicts
our premise. By consequence, x1 > y1 and xW y for any weakly maximin SWO
W . Since (iv) implies (iii), because ≺MI ⊂≺RDI , and (iii) implies (v), as shown
above, it follows furthermore that (iv) implies (v).
Equivalence of (ii) and (iv): The proof is very similar to that of the equivalence
of (i) and (iii) and is therefore omitted. 
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Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose W is an SWO that is extremely inequality averse in the class of mono-
tonic SWOs according to the L-BC. Then W is weakly maximin by Propo-
sition 8 and Remark 1. Next, consider any x,y ∈ X where x1 ≤ x2 < x3 and
y =
(
λx1,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 , . . . ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1
)
where λ is a scalar such that x1 > y1 and
x2 < y2. For any allowed value of λ , it holds that y ≺LI x. Now, x W y, while
there exists a monotonic SWO that implies a preference of y over x (since not
x > y). Hence, we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose W is a monotonic SWO that satisfies the condition stated in the propo-
sition. Now, consider x,y,z ∈ X such that x = 21n, y1 = 1 and yi = 3 for all
i = 2,3, . . . ,n, and zi = 2 for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(n−1) and zn = 2+4(n−1). It holds
that x≺LI y and y≺LI z. So, xW y and yW z by the condition. Moreover, zW x
by monotonicity. Hence, the SWO is intransitive, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 11
Take any x,y∈ X where x1 ≤ x2 < x3 and y =
(
λx1,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 , . . . ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1
)
where λ is a positive scalar. For any allowed value of λ , it holds that y ≺LI x.
Whenever λ = 1, then y W x by Lorenz consistency. By continuity and mono-
tonicity, there is an infinite number of λ s such that 0 < λ < 1 and y W x. Now,
for any such λ it holds that x is strictly preferred to y by all weakly maximin
SWOs. 
Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose W is a monotonic SWO that is more inequality averse than leximin.
Then, there is some pair x,y ∈ X such that x ≺LI y, x W y and leximin strictly
prefers y to x. By the latter condition, it holds that, either (a) x1 < y1, or (b) there
is a k > 1 such that, for all i = 1, . . . ,(k−1) it holds that xi = yi while xk < yk.
Now, consider a z∈ X such that, in case (a), x1 < z1 < y1 and z = z11n and, in case
(b), zi = xi = yi for all i = 1, . . . ,(k−1), xk < zk < min
(∑ni=k xi
n−k ,yk
)
and zi = zk for
all i = (k+1) , . . . ,n. Then, by monotonicity, y W z, and hence by transitivity
x W z. Now, z ≺LI x and leximin strictly prefers z to x. By consequence, W is
not more inequality averse than leximin and we have a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 13
Note first that a monotonic SWO W can only satisfy the condition stated in the
proposition if it is weakly maximin. Next, take an income distribution x ∈ X
where x1 < x2 < x3. By minimal invariance there must be some x′ ∈ X such that
x′ x and x I x′. Now consider an y such that x1 < y1 < x′1, y2 < x2 < x′2, and
x3 < x
′
3 < y3. Clearly, for any weakly maximin SWO W , it holds that y W x
and x′ W y. Now, suppose I is an inequality quasi-ordering that satisfies the
condition specified in the proposition. Then, x I x′, y ≺I x since not y > x, and
x′ ≺I y since not x′ > y. The IQO is intransitive, which is a contradiction. 
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